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STATE V. PATTON
(decided July 7, 2003)
ORIT TULCHINSKY*
I. INTRODUCTION
Courts have struggled to define appropriate limits on police
interrogations of suspected criminals.  Although case law clearly
prohibits admissions of confessions obtained by interrogation tech-
niques that overbear the will of the accused, courts disagree about
the admissibility of confessions obtained by deception or trickery.
In State v. Patton,1 the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of
New Jersey held that inducing a confession with tangible police-
fabricated evidence is a per se violation of due process.2  This Case
Comment will argue that the adoption of a per se rule was inappro-
priate.  Instead, the court should have distinguished between so-
called “extrinsic” and “intrinsic” falsehoods.  An extrinsic falsehood
is one outside the scope of the crime, such as a false promise of
release rather than incarceration or a false threat to take the ac-
cused’s children away.3  An intrinsic falsehood, by contrast, is one
that concerns evidence in the present case, such as a misrepresenta-
tion concerning incriminating evidence.4  Confessions induced by
extrinsic falsehoods should be inadmissible per se, while confessions
induced by intrinsic falsehoods should be evaluated under a “total-
ity of the circumstances” test to determine whether the confession
was voluntary.5
* J.D. candidate New York Law School, 2005.  The author would like to thank
Professors Tanina Rostain and Donald H. Zeigler for all their help.
1. 826 A.2d 783 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003).
2. Id. at 805.
3. State v. Kelekolio, 849 P.2d 58, 73 (Haw. 1993).
4. Id.
5. Sheriff, Washoe County v. Bessey, 914 P.2d 618, 619 (Nev. 1996).
371
18178_nlr_48-1-2 Sheet No. 189 Side B      04/27/2004   12:08:32
18178_nlr_48-1-2 Sheet No. 189 Side B      04/27/2004   12:08:32
C M
Y K
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\48-1-2\NLR403.txt unknown Seq: 2 26-APR-04 14:49
372 NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48
II. THE PATTON CASE
A. Facts
Ronald Patton was arrested for the murder of Gloria Hoke and
detained for nineteen hours.6  During this time, the police created
an audiotape depicting a fictitious eyewitness to the crime, hoping
it would induce Patton to confess.7  The audiotape described the
location of the murder, the suspect, the victim, the relationship be-
tween the suspect and the victim, and the circumstances of the mur-
der.8  The fictitious eyewitness implicated Patton in the crime.9
When the interrogation began, Patton signed a Miranda card
waiving his Fifth Amendment rights.10  The police then questioned
him about the night of the murder.11  When Patton was unrespon-
sive, the police informed him that they had interviewed an anony-
mous eyewitness to the crime and then played the fabricated
audiotape.12  The tape was not a recording of an actual eyewitness
interview, as Patton had been told, but was, instead, a recording of a
police officer pretending to be an eyewitness.13  The officer used
information gathered in a police investigation to make the record-
ing appear as though it were a real interview.14  Patton confessed
immediately after hearing the audiotape.15  The entire interroga-
tion process, including the confession, lasted less than one hour.16
B. Lower Court Decision
In a pre-trial motion the defendant sought to suppress his con-
fession by challenging the use of the fabricated audiotape.17  The
judge denied the motion, reasoning that obtaining confessions
6. Patton, 826 A.2d at 785.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 785-90.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 785.
11. Id.
12. Patton, 826 A.2d at 785.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 789.
16. Id.
17. Id. The defendant also argued that “after his arrest and at the time of his
statement, he was suffering from the effects of heroin withdrawal, and his statement was
‘coerced.’”
18178_nlr_48-1-2 Sheet No. 190 Side A      04/27/2004   12:08:32
18178_nlr_48-1-2 Sheet No. 190 Side A      04/27/2004   12:08:32
C M
Y K
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\48-1-2\NLR403.txt unknown Seq: 3 26-APR-04 14:49
2003] STATE V. PATTON 373
from criminal suspects serves a “useful social purpose,” and that be-
cause most criminals do not confess without sway, trickery may be
used to persuade them to do so.18  The judge reasoned that sophis-
ticated interrogation techniques involving insincerity and potential
deceit do not “remove a suspect’s free will” and thus, would not
elicit a confession from an innocent suspect.19  As a result, the pros-
ecution was permitted to admit the tape into evidence in order to
demonstrate the voluntariness of Patton’s confession.20  Subse-
quently, he was convicted of the murder.21
C. Appellate Opinion
Patton sought review in the appellate division, claiming a due
process violation because his confession was coerced by the
fabricated audiotape.22  The issue on appeal was whether using po-
lice-fabricated evidence to obtain a confession is a per se violation of
due process, or merely one factor to consider among others.23  The
court concluded that using police-fabricated evidence to coerce a
confession is per se a violation.24
In reaching this conclusion, the court distinguished other
cases that upheld confessions induced by police misrepresenta-
tions.25  After reviewing cases applying a per se rule and cases apply-
18. Patton, 826 A.2d at 785.
19. Id. at 790.
20. Id. This resulted in an evidentiary problem, leading to defendant’s move for a
mistrial after the tape was played. The contents of the tape included information about
“incidents of domestic violence and ‘other bad acts’ committed by the defendant,”
which are considered inadmissible under evidentiary rules prohibiting hearsay and
prohibiting use of bad acts to show bad general character. The motion for a mistrial was
denied, but the trial judge gave the jury a limiting instruction directing them to con-
sider the information that the tape provided, not “for the truth of the statement or as
proof that the defendant committed a violent act or is a bad person, [but] only as it
relates to the effect that the statement may have had upon the state of mind of the
defendant.”
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 791. The appellate division also addressed a secondary issue; whether the
police have the authority to stop, search and arrest a defendant after the receipt of an
anonymous tip.  The court remanded this issue to the trial court, requiring a detailed
review of the information transmitted to the police. See Patton, 826 A.2d at 805-07.
24. Patton, 826 A.2d at 805.
25. Id. at 793-94 (focusing specifically on Supreme Court and other Federal and
State Court interrogation cases).
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374 NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48
ing an “extrinsic/intrinsic” test, the court explained why it chose to
adopt a per se rule.26  The court buttressed its decision by analogiz-
ing Patton to other New Jersey cases requiring a per se exclusion of a
confession.27
The court began by reviewing United States Supreme Court
cases.  The Supreme Court has decided many cases involving inter-
rogation tactics and has found certain techniques permissible, and
others not.  The Court prohibits admission of confessions obtained
by physical abuse.28  In Brown v. Mississippi, the defendants were
whipped and beaten until they confessed.29  The Court held that
using physical abuse to obtain a confession is unconstitutional.30
These interrogation methods were “revolting to the sense of jus-
tice,” and using the confessions they induced to prosecute defen-
dants was a clear violation of due process.31
With respect to interrogations involving police misrepresenta-
tions, Patton explained, the Supreme Court has taken a “totality of
the circumstances” approach.32  This approach requires a court to
balance the suspect’s characteristics, including age, intelligence, ed-
ucation, and prior encounters with the law, as well as the conditions
under which the questioning took place, and determine whether
the combined facts were likely to result in a voluntary confession.33
Using this approach, the Supreme Court has upheld the admission
of some confessions induced by trickery or deceit and held others
inadmissible.  For example, in Frazier v. Cupp,34 the Supreme Court
held a confession voluntary even though police lied in telling the
defendant that his co-defendant had implicated him in the crime.35
Similarly, in Miller v. Fenton,36 the Court upheld a confession ob-
tained after the police lied about evidence they had against the de-
fendant and told him that he was not a criminal and should receive
26. Id. at 794-98.
27. Id. at 801-03.
28. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Patton, 826 A.2d at 800.
33. Id.
34. 294 U.S. 731 (1969).
35. Id.
36. 474 U.S. 104 (1985).
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2003] STATE V. PATTON 375
psychiatric help.37  On the other hand, the Supreme Court has con-
demned falsehoods that involve unfair psychological coercion.  For
example, in Lynumn v. Illinois,38 the Court invalidated a confession
obtained by threatening to take the defendant’s children away and
terminate her welfare benefits.39  Similarly, in Spano v. New York,40
the Court threw out a confession where a police officer, the defen-
dant’s childhood friend, told the defendant that his job and family
would be in jeopardy unless the defendant confessed.41
Patton also reviewed other state and federal court decisions
that used the totality of the circumstances test to determine the ad-
missibility of confessions obtained through trickery or deceit.42  Ul-
timately, however, Patton distinguished those cases on the ground
that they involved merely verbal misrepresentations, as opposed to
misrepresentations employing tangible police-fabricated
evidence.43
The court then proceeded to address decisions from other ju-
risdictions that involved tangible evidence.44  Based on the court’s
evaluation, it is evident that two different approaches have been
applied.  Courts have either per se rejected the use of tangible,
fabricated evidence to obtain a confession under all circumstances,
or they have used the extrinsic/intrinsic test, rejecting confessions
induced by extrinsic falsehoods while admitting confessions in-
duced by intrinsic untruths.45 Patton juxtaposed State v. Cayward,
37. Id.
38. 372 U.S. 528 (1963).
39. Id.
40. 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
41. Id.
42. Patton, 826 A.2d at 793-94.
43. Id. at 794.
44. Id.
45. See State v. Farley, 452 S.E.2d 50 (W. Va. 1994) (warning by court that if the
defendant had been shown a document indicating that he failed a polygraph test his
confession would not be upheld), State v. Kelekolio, 849 P.2d 58 (Haw. 1993) (setting
out the extrinsic/intrinsic approach and stating that deliberate falsehoods intrinsic to
the facts of the alleged offence in question will be treated as one of a totality of the
circumstances surrounding the confession or statement to be considered in assessing its
voluntariness), Arthur v. Commonwealth, 480 S.E.2d 749 (Va. 1997) (holding that a
confession resulting from police showing defendant “dummy” reports indicating that
defendant’s fingerprints and hair were found at the crime scene was voluntary), State v.
Whittington, 809 A.2d 721 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002) (upholding confession where
police placed an invisible powder on a pen they gave to defendant to use so that when
18178_nlr_48-1-2 Sheet No. 191 Side B      04/27/2004   12:08:32
18178_nlr_48-1-2 Sheet No. 191 Side B      04/27/2004   12:08:32
C M
Y K
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\48-1-2\NLR403.txt unknown Seq: 6 26-APR-04 14:49
376 NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48
which applied a per se rule, and Sheriff, Washoe County v. Bessey,
which applied the extrinsic/intrinsic test.
In State v. Cayward,46 the police fabricated two scientific reports
on official-looking stationary stating that the defendant’s semen
stains were found on the victim’s underwear.47  After viewing these
reports the defendant continued to deny his guilt.48  However,
when police mentioned that this evidence would be used to seek
the death penalty against him, the defendant confessed.49  The
court determined that confessions obtained by the use of fabricated
documents “overstepped the line of permissible deception,” and
were therefore per se inadmissible.50 Cayward reasoned that official-
looking documents give a “more permanent and facially reliable
impression than a simple verbal statement.”51  The court stated that
creating a false document “offends our traditional notions of due
process” because people do not expect police to go to such lengths
to obtain confessions.52  Additionally, the court feared that
fabricated reports would be used as evidence in court, thus prevent-
ing a defendant from having a fair trial.53  The court concluded
that police-fabricated evidence has “no place in our criminal justice
system” and that a confession obtained by using such “evidence” is
inadmissible per se.54
they later conducted a fake gun “blow back” test, it appeared to her that she still had
gun powder in her hand).
46. 552 So. 2d. 971 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
47. Id. at 972.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 973.
51. Id. at 974.
52. Cayward, 552 So. 2d. at 974.
53. Id. at 973-74.  The Patton court addressed the evidentiary concerns raised in
Cayward because the fabricated evidence in Patton found its way into court. At the Pat-
ton trial, the police-fabricated audiotape was played for the jury, resulting in otherwise
inadmissible evidence being heard.  Although the jury was given a limiting instruction,
the court determined that the prejudicial harm was already done.  Additionally, the
court reasoned that the tape provided a roadmap for the prosecutions case by demon-
strating that the defendant had “fought with the victim, was violent towards women, was
associated with drug users, and had shot the victim in the back while she was walking
down the alley.” The court did not allow such a neat summary of the prosecution’s side
to be presented to the jury. Patton, 826 A.2d at 798-99.
54. Cayward, 552 So. 2d. at 974.
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2003] STATE V. PATTON 377
In Sheriff, Washoe County v. Bessey, police created a falsified lab
report indicating the defendant had committed a sexual assault
against a minor.55  The defendant confessed immediately after this
report was presented to him.56 Washoe County declined to adopt a
per se rule.  Instead, it adopted an extrinsic/intrinsic approach
based on a Hawaii Supreme Court decision, State v. Kelekolio.57
The extrinsic/intrinsic approach requires a court to first deter-
mine whether the falsehood was extrinsic or intrinsic.58  An extrin-
sic falsehood is “a deliberate falsehood extrinsic to the facts of the
alleged offense, which are of a type reasonably likely to procure an
untrue statement or to influence an accused to make a confession
regardless of guilt.”59  An intrinsic falsehood is “a deliberate false-
hood intrinsic to the facts of the alleged offense.”60  If the falsehood
is deemed extrinsic, the court must find the confession inadmissi-
ble per se because it was obtained by coercion.61  However, if the
falsehood is deemed intrinsic, the court must apply the totality of
the circumstances test to determine whether the confession was
voluntary.62
The court in Washoe County determined that the fabricated re-
ports were intrinsic because they were essentially misrepresenta-
tions made by the police regarding incriminating evidence.63  The
court thus applied a totality of the circumstances test and con-
55. 914 P.2d at 619.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 620.
58. State v. Kelekolio, 849 P.2d 58, 73 (Haw. 1993).
59. Id.  Examples of extrinsic falsehoods are:
[1] assurances of divine salvation upon confession, [2] promises of mental
health treatment in exchange for confession, [3] assurances of more
favorable treatment rather than incarceration in exchange for confession,
[4] misrepresenting the consequences of a particular conviction, [5] repre-
sentation that welfare benefits would be withdrawn or children taken away
unless there is a confession or suggestion of harm or benefit to someone.
60. Id.  Examples of intrinsic falsehoods are:
[1] placement of the defendant’s vehicle at the crime scene, [2] physical
evidence linked to the victim in the defendants care, [3] presence of defen-
dant’s fingerprints at the crime scene or in the getaway car, [4] positive
identification by reliable eyewitnesses, and [5] identification of the defen-
dant’s semen in the crime scene.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See 914 P.2d at 621.
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378 NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48
cluded that “there was nothing in the treatment of the defendant
or the setting of the interrogation that was coercive.”64  The court
found that Bessey voluntarily went to the police station and that the
length of the interview was relatively short.65  The only factor the
court considered out of the ordinary was the production of the falsi-
fied lab report.66  The court saw no significant difference between
lying to the defendant through words and lying through the use of
fabricated documents.  It determined that there was nothing in the
lab report that would have produced a false confession.67  Finally,
Washoe County concluded that a per se rule would conflict with the
Supreme Court’s use of the totality of the circumstances test in in-
terrogation cases. The court stated that “as long as the [interroga-
tion] techniques do not tend to produce inherently unreliable
statements or revolt our sense of justice, they should not be de-
clared violative of the United States Constitution.”68
Patton concluded its analysis by likening the case to other New
Jersey cases that per se excluded confessions obtained in violation of
mandated procedures.69  In State v. Reed, the court held that state-
ments obtained after a suspect requested an attorney are automati-
cally inadmissible.70  Similarly, in State v. Presha, the court held that
statements obtained from an accused who is fourteen years old or
younger are per se inadmissible unless a parent or guardian is pre-
sent during the interrogation.71 Patton concluded that because the
courts in Reed and Presha rejected the totality of the circumstances
test and adhered instead to a per se rule, it could follow the same
approach.72
III. ANALYSIS
In sum, Patton adopted a per se rule suppressing confessions
obtained using tangible police-fabricated evidence.73  The court
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 622.
69. Patton, 826 A.2d at 801-02.
70. State v. Reed, 627 A.2d 630 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1993).
71. State v. Presha, 748 A.2d 1108 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 2000).
72. See Patton, 826 A.2d at 802.
73. Id. at 805.
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2003] STATE V. PATTON 379
first distinguished interrogation techniques using verbal misrepre-
sentations from those using physical misrepresentations by reason-
ing that the physical appearance of incriminating evidence would
compel even an innocent person to confess.74  This stringent ap-
proach prevents modern and effective interrogation techniques
from being used.  Instead, Patton should have employed the extrin-
sic/intrinsic approach demonstrated in Sheriff, Washoe County.75
The following will discuss why adopting the extrinsic/intrinsic ap-
proach to determine the voluntariness of a confession is more ap-
propriate than adopting a per se rule.
The extrinsic/intrinsic approach should have been applied in
Patton because it incorporates the totality of the circumstances test,
which is the basic test for voluntariness of confessions that the
United States Supreme Court has set out.76  Like the totality of the
circumstances test, the extrinsic/intrinsic approach balances the
desire to obtain confessions from guilty suspects with the Court’s
duty to uphold Fifth Amendment protections.77  A per se rule, in
contrast, fails to meet this balance because it only accounts for the
individual’s constitutional rights, while ignoring the benefits of ob-
taining confessions.  In light of the Supreme Court’s goals in inter-
rogation cases, Patton’s abandonment of the totality of the
circumstances test was improper.
Patton suggested that the Supreme Court’s application of the
totality of the circumstances test was appropriate in analyzing con-
fessions where the police merely made misrepresentations to the
suspect, but was inappropriate in analyzing confessions where po-
lice used tangible, fabricated evidence.78  The extrinsic/intrinsic
approach should have been applied, however, because the distinc-
74. See id. at 795.
75. In Washoe County, the detective’s lies, as well as the falsified lab reports, went to
the strength of the evidence against the defendant, a consideration intrinsic to the facts
of the alleged offence.  Therefore, the court considered the totality of the circum-
stances to determine whether the confession was voluntary.  The totality of the circum-
stances approach determined that since Bessey went to the police station voluntarily,
the length of the interview was relatively short, and the only factor that was out of the
ordinary was the production of the falsified lab report, there was nothing in the treat-
ment of Bessey or the setting of the interrogation that was coercive. 914 P.2d at 621.
76. Washoe County, 914 P.2d at 621.
77. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 514 (1963).
78. See Patton, 826 A.2d at 794.
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380 NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48
tion between verbal and physical misrepresentations “is a distinc-
tion without a real difference.”79  Both verbal and physical
misrepresentations involve police lying to suspects about incrimi-
nating evidence and have a similar probability of coercing an inno-
cent person to confess to a crime that they did not commit.80
Therefore, the distinction is not significant enough to mandate the
adoption of a per se rule.
A per se rule should be reserved for only the most heinous cir-
cumstances.81  For example, a per se rule was adopted in Brown v.
Mississippi, where confessions were obtained using physical abuse.82
It is apparent that Patton is unlike Brown; using tangible police-
fabricated evidence to obtain a confession is more analogous to a
police misrepresentation than to physical abuse.  While physical
abuse has a high probability of leading to an involuntary confession
because the suspect will do and say anything to stop the pain, the
use of tangible police-fabricated evidence would not have the same
effect.83
The intrinsic/extrinsic approach also should be applied to this
case because Patton’s reliance on State v. Reed and State v. Presha is
unfounded.  Unlike Patton, both Reed and Presha involve situations
where a per se rule is necessary to protect an individual’s rights.  In
State v. Reed a per se rule was necessary because the suspect was not
informed that the attorney he requested had arrived.84  The right
to counsel during a police interrogation has been viewed as a neces-
sary preventative measure to protect a suspect from self-incrimina-
tion.85  Once an attorney is requested, the suspect has a right to
consult with her.86  Therefore, Reed established a necessary, firm
rule, to enforce this right.  Similarly, in State v. Presha, the court
insisted on a per se rule to prevent juveniles under the age of four-
79. Washoe County, 914 P.2d at 621.
80. Welsh S. White, False Confessions and the Constitution: Safeguards Against Untrust-
worthy Confessions, 32 HARV. C.R.- C.L. L. REV. 105, 146 (1997).
81. See Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961), Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165
(1952).  Both followed Brown in declaring that using physical abuse during interroga-
tions renders the confessions involuntary.  Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
82. Brown, 297 U.S. at 286.
83. See generally Marcy Strauss, Torture, 48 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 203 (2004).
84. Reed, 627 A.2d at 631.
85. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
86. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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2003] STATE V. PATTON 381
teen from being questioned without a parent or guardian present.87
Although age is usually only one factor under the totality of the
circumstances test, children fall under a special category.  When
children are involved there is an overriding concern for the protec-
tion of their rights because they have an “obvious disadvantage” in
police interrogations.88
The reasons for a per se rule in Patton are not on par with the
reasons proposed in the above cases.  A per se rule is necessary in
Reed and Presha because both a person without the option to have
counsel present and a child without the presence of a guardian are
not adequately protected from being coerced to confess.  In con-
trast, cases involving police-fabricated evidence, like Patton, do not
involve a violation of an established fundamental right.  Courts
have upheld misrepresentations to suspects as long as they are not
coercive in light of the surrounding circumstances.  Therefore, a
protection in the form of a per se rule is unnecessary.
The Patton court also adhered to the policy considerations and
practical concerns raised in Cayward, but applied them improperly,
leading to the adoption of a per se rule.  The Patton court took a
policy position that is in opposition to the considerations discussed
at the initial trial.  The lower court judge posited “there is no ques-
tion that the use of trickery and deception provides a highly effec-
tive means of extracting confessions; and given the important role
of confessions in law enforcement, police must be free to employ
effective means of obtaining them.”89  The method employed here
is effective, as it is not barbaric, physically abusive or inherently
wrong.  Using police-fabricated evidence merely allows police to
enter the technological era and use tools that are more sophisti-
cated in order to elicit confessions.  This method has a better
chance of getting honest results, without going so far as to coerce
an innocent person into confession.
Instead of adopting a per se rule, the Patton court should have
applied the intrinsic/extrinsic approach to the facts of the case.
The police-fabricated evidence in Patton was intrinsic, as it was “a
misrepresentation by police regarding the existence of incriminat-
87. Presha, 748 A.2d. at 1110.
88. Id. at 1114.
89. Patton, 826 A.2d at 789.
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382 NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48
ing evidence.”90  Thus, the totality of the circumstances test should
have been applied to assess whether the confession was voluntary.
Regardless of the outcome, adopting an extrinsic/intrinsic test
would be more appropriate as it would follow existing law and es-
tablish a just approach to handling tangible, police-fabricated evi-
dence cases.91
90. Washoe County, 914 P.2d 618, 620.
91. The court applied the totality of the circumstances test and determined that
“because the defendant was held [in custody] for nineteen hours before questioning;
the jail admission form suggested heroin withdrawal; the confession came immediately
after [the] defendant heard the fabricated audiotape. . .the entire interrogation lasted
less than one hour; and the confession was prompted by police-fabricated evidence,”
the defendant’s rights were violated and the case would need to be remanded. Patton,
826 A.2d at 803 n.7.
